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Technological University One of the great difficulties of planetary astronomy at around the turn of the 
seventeenth century was that the observed two-dimensional motions of the planets across the celestial 
sphere are consistent with three different theories of the actual three- dimensional motions of the 
planets through space—the Ptolemaic theory, the Copernican theory, and the Tychonic theory. In other 
words, the theory of the actual motions of the planets was underdetermined by the available 
observations. In fact, as Kepler showed in the Astronomia Nova, by making minor modifications, you 
could make the theories empirically indistinguishable from each other, given the kinds of observations 
that were available at the time. It seemed to some astronomers in the sixteenth century that this 
underdetermination is unresolvable, and that, in fact, trying to determine the actual motions of the 
planets should not even be an aim of planetary astronomy.  
 
The standard way to think about such cases of underdetermination is the following. We have a certain 
set of observations, in this case the two-dimensional motions of the planets across the celestial sphere. 
We have two or more sets of hypotheses, in this case the Ptolemaic theory, the Copernican theory, and 
the Tychonic theory. You deduce what observations you ought to see for each of the three theories, and 
then you compare these predicted observations with actual observations. Usually, you would accept the 
theory that has the best agreement between the predicted observations and the actual observations. 
But in some cases, more than one theory agrees with the observations just as well. These are cases of 
underdetermination. Philosophers have suggested ways of choosing between theories in cases of 
underdetermination, such as through so-called empirical virtues such as simplicity, but there is an 
undeniable arbitrariness in judging theories against such virtues.  
 
I want to think about the problem of planetary astronomy, and certain cases of underdetermination, in a 
completely different way. We do not think of the problem as one of trying to find a theory that fits 
observations. Rather, we think of the solar system as what I call a complicated, partially inaccessible 
system. A complicated system is one that consists of many parts, those parts having various properties 
and relations with each other. I say a system is partially inaccessible if we can only confidently measure 
a proper part of the properties of, and relations between, the parts of that object. The solar system is 
obviously complicated in this sense—it consists of planets with various properties such as mass and 
relations such as planetary distances. In the seventeenth century, it was partially inaccessible. For 
example, the actual distances between the planets in three-dimensional space could not be known, 
because distances along the line of sight from the Earth could not be measured directly.  
 
We can now think of the problem of planetary astronomy as one of determining a certain kind of 
inaccessible relation—actual distances between the planets in threedimensional space—from relations 
that are accessible to us, namely the twodimensional motions of the planets across the celestial sphere. 
Or, to put it another way, it is a problem in reconstructing three-dimensional motions from a 
twodimensional projection of those motions. When we project three-dimensional motion onto two 
dimensions, we are losing information, because a two-dimensional projection can be compatible with 
many different three-dimensional motions. That is, in fact, one way of thinking about the 
underdetermination between the Ptolemaic, Copernican, and Tychonic theories.  
 
In the Astronomia Nova, Kepler solves this problem by using the method of triangulation—setting up a 
triangle with the Sun, the Earth, and Mars at the corners and using geometrical relations to determine 
actual distances between the Earth and Mars. In order to determine these angles, however, it turns out 
that you must separate out the effects due to two different features of the planetary motions, known 
from the time of Ptolemy as the first inequality and the second inequality. The determination of the 
effects of the first and second inequalities is intertwined—in order to find out what the effect of the first 
inequality is, you must know the effect of the second inequality. In order to find out what the effect of 
the second inequality is, you must know the effect of the first inequality. Thus, there is a difficult 
problem of somehow separating out these intertwined effects. 
 
 More generally, I argue elsewhere that separating out effects that add together in this way, a process 
that I call decomposition, is actually an important part of acquiring knowledge about many partially 
inaccessible systems. In order to perform decomposition, you must make certain assumptions about the 
structure of the system. A question that often arises, then, is how to justify these assumptions.  
 
I examine how Kepler carries out this process of decomposition in the Astronomia Nova, and then 
consider how the assumptions he uses are justified. I argue that the assumptions are ultimately justified 
by success in the very process of decomposition itself. For Kepler, the first inequality corresponds to 
features of the orbit of Mars, while the second inequality corresponds to the orbit of the Earth. A better 
determination of the Earth orbit allows a better determination of the Mars orbit, while a better 
determination of the Mars orbit allows a better determination of the Earth orbit. Success in further and 
further refining the orbits of Mars and the Earth is a good sign that the decomposition is on the right 
track.  
 
This way of thinking about underdetermination provides a new understanding of how certain cases of 
underdetermination get resolved. By making certain assumptions about a system, measurements of 
theretofore inaccessible parts of the system could be enabled. These new measurements can, in some 
cases, resolve the underdetermination. The assumptions that enable the new measurements to be 
made are ultimately justified by success in carrying out the decomposition. Thus, the 
underdetermination is resolved by the enablement of new measurements through assumptions that are 
ultimately justified down the road. 
 
